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Most research on the relationship between attention and consciousness has been limited
to perception. However, perceptions are not the only kinds of mental contents of which
we can be conscious. An important set of conscious states that has not received proper
treatment within this discussion is that of memories. This paper reviews compelling evi-
dence indicating that attention may be necessary, but probably not sufﬁcient, for conscious
recollection. However, it is argued that unlike the case of conscious perception, the kind of
attention required during recollection is internal, as opposed to external, attention. As such,
the surveyed empirical evidence is interpreted as suggesting that internal attention is nec-
essary, but probably not sufﬁcient, for conscious recollection.The paper begins by justifying
the need for clear distinctions among different kinds of attention, and then emphasizes the
difference between internal and external attention. Next, evidence from behavioral, neu-
ropsychological, and neuroimaging studies suggesting that internal attention is required for
the successful retrieval of memorial contents is reviewed. In turn, it is argued that inter-
nal attention during recollection is what makes us conscious of the contents of retrieved
memories; further evidence in support of this claim is also provided. Finally, it is suggested
that internal attention is probably not sufﬁcient for conscious recollection. Open questions
and possible avenues for future research are also mentioned.
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INTRODUCTION
Although few would deny that consciousness and attention are
intimately intertwined, their precise relationship remains unclear.
Generally speaking, opinions about the nature of their relation-
ship fall within one of three general views. The ﬁrst view holds
that attention is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient for consciousness
(Lamme, 2003; Koivisto et al., 2005). According to this perspec-
tive, even though attention and consciousness regularly occur in
tandem, under speciﬁc circumstances they can be separated, sug-
gesting that, in fact, consciousness and attention are dissociable
processes (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007). It follows from this view that
it is possible to attend to something one is not conscious of, just as
it is possible to be conscious of something while not attending to
it. The second view, in contrast, holds that attention is necessary
and sufﬁcient for consciousness (Posner, 1994; Prinz, 2000, 2011).
According to this perspective, the mechanisms of consciousness
and attention are not entirely dissociable – although it remains
an open question whether the precise relationship between such
mechanisms is that of identity, causality, or constituency (Block,
in preparation). A consequence of this view is that one cannot be
conscious of something unless one attends to it, just as one cannot
attend to something and fail to be conscious of it. Finally, there is
an intermediate position according to which attention is necessary
but not sufﬁcient for consciousness (Moran and Desimone, 1985;
Merikle and Joordens, 1997; Rensink et al., 1997; Dehaene et al.,
2006; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). It follows from this view that
one cannot be conscious of something unless one attends to it, but
attending to something is not enough to make one conscious of
it, insofar as other processes are required. As such, this third view
agrees with the ﬁrst one in that it denies that attention is sufﬁcient
for consciousness, while at the same time agrees with the second
view in suggesting that attention is necessary for consciousness.
Since most research on attention has been limited to percep-
tion – which in turn is usually conﬁned to vision and, to a lesser
degree, audition – it is unsurprising to ﬁnd that most of the dis-
cussion on attention and consciousness has focused on conscious
perception. However, perceptual contents are not the only kind of
mental contents of which we are ordinarily conscious. An impor-
tant set of conscious mental states which has not been sufﬁciently
addressed within this discussion, is that of memories. When we
remember, we usually experience something akin to the reinstate-
ment of the content of a previous experience, which may or may
not have been perceptual1. To be sure,memory enables us to recall
past visual or auditory experiences, but it also brings to mind old
nightmares and long-gone aspirations. Unlike perception, which
allows us to be consciously aware of our present, memory allows
us to be consciously aware of our past. As a result, it is natural
to wonder whether or not attention plays a role during conscious
1Strictly speaking,when we remember we not only experience something akin to the
reinstatement of the content of the original experience but also the sense of having
experienced such a content in the past. In the philosophy of memory there is some
debate as to whether this “double-consciousness” is to be understood as the belief
that what content of the memory portrays occurred to us in the past (e.g., Locke
and Russell) or rather as an emotion with no cognitive content (e.g.,William James,
see Locke, 1971). In psychology and cognitive neuroscience these issues are usually
studied under the rubric“metamemory.”Since the purpose of the present paper is to
understand the role of attention in the conscious recollection of memorial contents,
this interesting metamemory issue will be sidestepped.
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recollection, and also whether or not that role is analogous to
the role it plays during conscious perception. Does conscious
recollection depend in any way on attention or are they indepen-
dent processes? More generally, what is the relationship between
attention and consciousness during conscious recollection?
In this paper I want to defend the claim that attention is
necessary, but probably not sufﬁcient, for conscious recollection.
However, unlike the case of conscious perception, I argue that
the kind of attention required during recollection is internal, as
opposed to external, attention. This makes the role of attention
during conscious recollection signiﬁcantly similar, but also impor-
tantly different, from the role it plays during conscious perception.
More precisely, then, I argue that internal attention is necessary,
but probably not sufﬁcient, for conscious recollection. To that end,
in Section “Varieties of Attention” I start by justifying the need for
clear distinctions among different kinds of attention, emphasizing
the difference between internal and external attention. In Section
“Internal Attention and Episodic Memory Retrieval,” I review evi-
dence from behavioral, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging
studies suggesting that internal attention is required for the suc-
cessful retrieval of memorial contents. Next, in Section “Internal
Attention is Necessary for Conscious Recollection,” I argue that
internal attention during recollection is what makes us conscious
of the contents of retrieved memories. In turn, in Section “Inter-
nal Attention May Not be Sufﬁcient for Conscious Recollection,”
I brieﬂy argue for the probable non-sufﬁciency of internal atten-
tion for conscious recollection. I conclude with some questions
for future research.
VARIETIES OF ATTENTION
When James remarked that “everyone knows what attention is”
(James, 1890), he was rather overconﬁdent. In reality, there seems
to be a substantial amount of disagreement as to what the nature
of attention is (Styles, 1997). Part of the problem is that neither
the folk nor the scientiﬁc use of the term“attention” is sufﬁciently
precise. We usually employ the term “attention” in non-scientiﬁc
contexts to refer to a wide array of phenomena. The word “atten-
tion” sometimes refers to the way in which we engage in certain
cognitive tasks; like when we play chess attentively rather than dis-
tractedly. Other times “attention” means bringing something to
the foreground of the mind, as when we mentally single out the
player with the ball when watching a soccer game. Yet, on other
occasions, we use the term “attention” to explain why we were not
aware of certain information – as when we justify our failing to
remember someone’s remark, or our inability to recognize a par-
ticular street when ambling absentmindedly, by simply saying that
we were not paying attention. The problem is not with our use of
the term “attention” in such circumstances. The trouble is rather
that “attention” is not the only term we can employ to convey
the same message. In certain contexts we use terms like “perceiv-
ing,” “noticing,” “being aware of,” and even “being conscious of”
whenwe could have easily used the term“attending”instead.Given
people often use these terms interchangeably (De Brigard, 2010),
this lack of semantic precision between the words “consciousness”
and “attention” becomes more problematic when trying to iden-
tify the relationship between the two folk psychological notions,
“consciousness,” and “attention.”
Semantic consensus is not found in scientiﬁc circles either.
On the one hand, there is disagreement as to whether “attention”
refers to a personal or a sub-personal phenomenon (Watzl, 2011).
Speciﬁcally, there is disagreement as to whether attention refers
to a process one should expect to ﬁnd a neural correlate for; or
whether it refers to something the person does in virtue of having
a brain, but for which it would be a category-mistake to try to
ﬁnd a neural correlate (Mole, 2010;Wu, 2011). On the other hand,
there is disagreement as to whether or not attention names a nat-
ural kind. For instance, some suggest that attention does not name
a single cognitive mechanism, but rather denotes particular ways
in which certain cognitive processes can be carried out. Listening
attentively andobserving attentively arenot twodifferent processes
(i.e., audition and vision) that share a common third mechanism
(i.e., attention); they are simply two different cognitive processes,
carried out in distinctly precise ways that may or may not share
common properties (Parasuraman, 2000; Duncan, 2006). As such,
it would be a mistake to try to ﬁnd the neural correlate of attention
per se, independently of other cognitive processes. In contrast, one
could see attention as a uniﬁed cognitive process with either an
identiﬁable sub-personal neural correlate (Prinz, 2011), or a set of
personal-level phenomena such as behaviors (Wu, 2011) or sub-
jective mental contents (Smithies, 2011; Watzl, 2011). Those who
consider attention reducible to a neural process face the daunting
task of identifying a single brain mechanism responsible for all
forms of attentive behavior. Likewise, those who think that atten-
tion could be identiﬁed with a series of personal-level phenomena
face the difﬁcult task of discerning necessary and sufﬁcient con-
ditions for behaviors or subjective states to qualify as instances of
attention.
Employing different methods, many cognitive neuroscientists
working on attention adopt a reductionist approach. Critics of
this approach claim that extant empirical evidence strongly sug-
gests that there may not be a single neural mechanism responsible
for all forms of attention (Wu,2011). The lack of a common neural
denominator for all forms of attention would make it tempting to
advocate either for anti-reductionism – so that we are to ﬁnd the
essence of attention at the personal rather than the sub-personal
neuronal level (Mole, 2010; Watzl, 2011) – or for eliminativism,
ridding scientiﬁcpsychologyof the term“attention”(Allport,1993;
Anderson, 2011). But there is another alternative. “Attention”may
not name a single uniﬁed neural mechanism. Indeed, it may not
name a natural kind at all. Yet it may be worth keeping around in
our scientiﬁc practice. After all, not all scientiﬁcally useful psycho-
logical terms refer to natural kinds, let alone single neural mecha-
nisms. Consider memory. Memory researchers have struggled for
decades to come up with a single uniﬁed deﬁnition of “memory”;
something general enough to encompass different kinds of mem-
ory (i.e., semantic, episodic, implicit, etc.), but speciﬁc enough to
separate it from other forms of cognitive and non-cognitive phe-
nomena (Tulving, 2002). Additionally, extant scientiﬁc evidence
conclusively shows that different forms of memory are subserved
by different neural mechanisms (Schacter et al., 2000; De Brigard
et al., in press). Nonetheless, despite longstanding disagreements
as to what its essence may be, and despite its multiple and dis-
joint neural implementations, “memory” is still a useful term in
scientiﬁc psychology as well as neuroscience.
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I believe “attention” might be just like “memory.” In a recent
review, Chun et al. (2011) put forth precisely this proposal. Con-
sistent with the anti-reductionist spirit regarding attention, Chun
et al. agree that there are multiple attentional systems that appear
to be correlated with different neural mechanisms. But the fact
that there may not be a single neural property shared by all atten-
tional systems does not deter them from suggesting that all forms
of attention share three essential properties at the computational
level. First, according to Chun et al. (2011), attention is essen-
tially a ﬁltering process with limited informational capacity. Since
the amount of information we live in exceeds our capacity to
effectively process it, attention evolved to ﬁlter out irrelevant infor-
mation detrimental to the ongoing cognitive or behavioral task
(Pashler et al., 2001). Second, attention is essentially selective. In
ﬁltering out information for subsequent processing, attention nec-
essarily selects informational items that will be further processed
from those that will not. Finally, attention modulates the ease
of processing of the selected information. Attended information
is processed more efﬁciently and more deeply than information
that is not selected by attentional mechanisms. Thus, according to
Chun et al. (2011), all forms of attention share these three com-
putational characteristics (i.e., ﬁltering, selectiveness, and modu-
lation), which may or may not be implemented by the same neural
mechanism. Indeed, they suggest that trying to understand differ-
ent kinds of attention in terms of their neural mechanisms may
not be the best way to proceed. Instead, they suggest a taxonomy
based on the type of information attention operates over; what
they call “the targets of attention.”
According to Chun et al. (2011) proposed taxonomy, atten-
tion can be captured, ﬁrst and foremost, either by targets in one’s
surrounding environment (external) or within one’s own mind
(internal). Thus, external versus internal attention constitute the
ﬁrst taxonomical division. External attention refers to the ﬁltering,
selection, and modulation of externally generated sensory infor-
mation, whereas internal attention refers to the ﬁltering, selection,
and modulation of internally generated information – in the form
of representations containing information not directly linked to
objects in one’s immediate surrounding environment. It is worth
noting that the division between internal and external attention
is similar to, but also importantly different from, categorizations
that have been proposed in the past. For instance, attention has
been separated into exogenous and endogenous attention (Egeth
and Yantis, 1997). Endogenous attention refers to the voluntary
selection and modulation of information elicited by top-down
mechanisms of orientation and control, such as one’s goals and
intentions. Conversely, exogenous attention refers to the involun-
tary and bottom-up driven allocation of attention onto a target
that is noted or otherwise cognitively highlighted for reasons
outside of one’s control. Endogenous and exogenous attention,
however,donotmaponto the internal/external classiﬁcation.After
all, external objects can be attended both endogenously – as when
we voluntarily and in a controlled manner direct our attention
to a desired external target – and exogenously, as when a partic-
ular external target captures our attention involuntarily and in a
mandatory fashion. Another popular division is between covert
and overt attention (Wright and Ward, 2008). Overt attention
refers to a shift in attentional allocation accompanied by noticeable
eye movements; whereas covert attention refers to a shift in atten-
tional allocation with the eyes ﬁxed on a certain target. However,
as with the endogenous/exogenous dichotomy, the covert/overt
distinction does not map squarely onto the internal/external cat-
egorization either. For one, as it has been shown experimentally,
it is possible to divert attention from one target onto another
without concomitant saccadic movements (Juan et al., 2004) –
which, incidentally, evidences the fact that attention can be spread
over a region of space and not only toward individual objects.
Likewise, evidence shows that attention allocated to internally gen-
erated information is often times accompanied by eye movements
(Hunt and Kingstone, 2003). Finally, it is extremely improba-
ble that eye movements could provide a useful wedge to divide
internal and external attention to non-visual stimuli. Therefore,
mechanism-based dissociations such as endogenous/exogenous
and covert/overt do not map onto the target-based distinction
between internal and external attention suggested by Chun et al.
(2011).
By embracing Chun et al.’s (2011) informational target- rather
than amechanism-based taxonomy for attention, I amcommitting
to the very real possibility that internal and external attention may
not share the same neural operations. This consequence already
appears to be validated by recent studies showing dissociations
between brain regions engaged during internal-monitoring tasks
and brain regions involved in external orienting and detection
tasks (e.g., Esterman et al., 2009). Moreover, it is also expected
that more ﬁne-grained distinctions within these categories, such
as feature- versus object-based attention within external attention,
will map onto different neural mechanisms. Given this variabil-
ity in the neural implementation of different kinds of attention,
it is difﬁcult to assess general claims like “attention is necessary
for consciousness” or “attention is sufﬁcient for consciousness.” If
either of these claims is supposed to capture something about the
relationship between the mechanisms of attention and conscious-
ness, they must be modiﬁed so as to specify the kind of attention
to which they are supposed to apply. Since we are concerned here
with conscious recollection, where the information of which we
are aware is internally generated, the relevant kind of attention
is internal. However, in order to understand the role of internal
attention in conscious recollection, it is essential to ﬁrst explore its
role during episodic memory retrieval.
INTERNAL ATTENTION AND EPISODIC MEMORY RETRIEVAL
As mentioned above, external attention involves the ﬁltering,
selection, and modulation of sensory information (Chun et al.,
2011). In addition, external attention can be allocated to one or
to several sensory modalities, it can be focal or distributed spa-
tially, and it can be transient or sustained. Each one of these
forms of external attention activates distinct brain mechanism,
some of which share certain features. For instance, visual atten-
tion enhances retinotopical activation in the visual cortex (Tootell
et al., 1998), while auditory attention does so tonotopically in the
auditory cortex (Woldforff et al., 1993). Thus, although the rele-
vant cortical areas of enhanced activation differ across modalities,
the speciﬁc processing elicited by attention appears to be similar.
Likewise, external attention is known to recruit a fronto-parietal
network of activation (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). However,
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it has been shown that the timing of this recruitment differs
depending on whether attention is goal-directed or stimulus-
driven. Goal-directed or “top-down” attention recruits frontal
regions of the fronto-parietal network ﬁrst; stimulus-driven or
“bottom-up” attention recruits parietal regions ﬁrst (Buschman
and Miller, 2007). Thus, while both top-down and bottom-up
attention recruit similar brain regions, the order in which these
regions are recruited differs.
Unsurprisingly, the mechanisms responsible for internal and
external attention have much in common. Internal attention,
deﬁned as the ﬁltering, selection, and modulation of internally
generated information, operates over representations of items and
events that need not be in the subject’s immediate environment.
Paradigmatically, internal attention operates over representations
entertained during decision-making and working-memory tasks,
but also – as I shall argue below – during retrieval of episodic
information from long-term memory. Studies on task selection,
in which competing options are ﬁltered, chosen, and maintained,
have shown speciﬁc capacity limitations expected from internal
attentional processes. For instance, when choices are produced
in rapid succession, the second response is delayed if presented
less than half a second after the ﬁrst choice – an effect known as
“psychological refractory period” (Pashler, 1994). This bottleneck
effect parallels well-known external attention effects, such as the
attentional blink, in which a perceptual stimulus goes unnoticed
if presented in close succession. Moreover, neuroimaging stud-
ies have shown common recruitment of regions engaged during
attentional blink and the psychological refractory period (Wong,
2002; Marois and Ivanoff, 2005; Hesselmann et al., 2011; Marti
et al., 2012), suggesting again the involvement of a common
mechanism. Further neuroimaging studies on task selection have
shown recruitment of several brain regions also associated with
external attention, such as the prefrontal and anterior cingulated
cortices (Botvinick et al., 2001). The overlap between internal and
external attention mechanisms is even greater during working-
memory tasks. For example, the maintenance of representations in
working-memory modulates modality congruent sensory cortices
(Serences et al., 2009) much the same way external attention mod-
ulates activation of sensory cortices during perception. Likewise,
working-memory tasks are disrupted by material-congruent dis-
traction tasks, suggesting – once again – recruitment of common
mechanisms.
Despite their similarities, internal, and external attention dif-
fer in important respects. In an illuminating study, Nobre et al.
(2004) directly compared brain activity associated with atten-
tional orientation during a perceptual and a working-memory
task. Although, as expected, both tasks recruited a common net-
work of brain regions, some important differences emerged. In
particular, the right inferior parietal cortex, extending onto poste-
rior angular gyrus, was preferentially involved in the orientation
of external attention. On the other hand, bilateral intraparietal
sulcus, as well as right ventral and bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal
cortices, were preferentially recruited in orientation shifts during
the internal attention task. These results were corroborated and
expandeduponbyEstermanet al. (2009).Usingmultivoxel pattern
classiﬁcation (MVPA) analysis they trained a classiﬁer that suc-
cessfully identiﬁed subpopulations of neurons within the superior
parietal lobule preferentially associated with either internal or
external attention-related activity. Finally, recent evidence show-
ing differences between neural regions recruited during internal
and external attention tasks comes from a study by Sestieri et al.
(2010). In this study, participants engaged in top-down atten-
tional search tasks looking for stimuli that were either retrieved
or perceived. A direct comparison showed preferential activation
in the angular gyrus, extending rostrally toward supramarginal
gyrus and dorsally toward the intraparietal sulcus, precuneus, and
posterior cingulate cortex for the memory search task. In contrast,
the medial and ventral banks of the posterior intraparietal sulcus,
as well as the superior parietal lobule, were preferentially associ-
ated with the perceptual search task. Taken together, the evidence
just surveyed suggests that even though there is substantial over-
lap between internal and external attention, there are important
differences as well (for a recent review, see Chun and Johnson,
2011).
Notwithstanding the substantial commonalities in the neural
activations between internal and external attention, recent behav-
ioral evidence is starting to suggest that internal rather than
external attention may play a fundamental role during memory
retrieval. Barring a few exceptions (e.g., Johnston et al., 1970;
Trumbo and Milone, 1971), until the mid-1980s most memory
researchers thought that, while attention was critical during mem-
ory encoding, it was not necessary for episodic memory retrieval.
Neuropsychological evidence favored this claim, insofar as patients
with attentional deﬁcits due to parietal lesions showed no impair-
ments during memory tasks (Critchley, 1953). Similar conclu-
sions were reached by researchers conducting studies in which
attention was manipulated during memory retrieval. In a classic
paper, Baddeley et al. (1984) conducted a series of experiments
using different attention-demanding secondary tasks during both
encoding and retrieval. They found that, during encoding, all
attention-demanding secondary tasks consistently impaired sub-
sequent memory tests relative to conditions in which attention
remained undisrupted. However, during retrieval, the same sec-
ondary tasks left memory performance unscathed. As a result,
Baddeley et al. (1984) suggested that memory retrieval was a rel-
atively automatic and mandatory operation that did not require
the allocation of attentional resources. Since then, numerous stud-
ies have conﬁrmed and clariﬁed the essential role attention plays
during episodic memory encoding (for a review, see Chun and
Turk-Browne, 2007).
This dominant view has been recently challenged by a series
of innovative studies showing that, under certain conditions,
divided attention during episodic retrieval can actually affect
memory performance. In a pioneer study, Fernandes and Moscov-
itch (2000) showed that when people engage in a material-
congruent secondary task in a divided attention paradigm during
retrieval, performance signiﬁcantly decreases relative to a base-
line in which the memory test is the only task. In a related
study, Hicks and Marsh (2000) showed that under deep encod-
ing conditions divided attention at retrieval signiﬁcantly reduces
successful recollection. Indeed, they argue that previous studies
failed to ﬁnd effects of divided attention during retrieval pre-
cisely because they used shallow as opposed to deep encoding
strategies. As a result, Hicks and Marsh (2000) hypothesize that,
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consistent with the dual-process theory of recognition memory2,
successful memory retrieval requires attention only when it is
recollection- rather than familiarity-based (Yonelinas, 2002). The
necessity of attention for material-congruent and recollection-
based memory retrieval was nicely conﬁrmed by Skinner and
Fernandes (2008) who, employing a Remember/Know paradigm
typically used to tap at differences between recollection and
familiarity, showed that divided attention during retrieval only
affected “Know” responses for material-congruent items. When
the secondary task involved contents that differed from the target
material (e.g., numerical tasks during retrieval of verbal infor-
mation), and such materials were shallow versus deeply encoded,
divided attention did not affect memory performance. Finally,
Lozito and Mulligan (2006) extended these results by show-
ing that, under conditions of strategic encoding (that need not
be semantic) divided attention produces detrimental effects at
retrieval. Taken together, the results of these – and related (e.g.,
Fernandes et al., 2005; Skinner et al., 2009) – studies suggest that
divided attention affects recollection of strategic, deeply encoded
information when attention is directed to material-congruent
contents.
In addition to using shallow encoding strategies, previous
studies failed to ﬁnd an effect of attention during recollec-
tion for another reason: they either employed attention-diverting
tasks with external targets (e.g., serial search) rather than inter-
nal targets, or they used material-incongruent tasks (e.g., num-
ber counting in verbal tasks) that did not demand the use of
resources that internal attention was allocating to the process of
recollecting memories. However, when the concurrent attention-
diverting task employed duringmemory retrieval targeted internal
and material-congruent contents, recollection was signiﬁcantly
impaired. Consequently, focusing one’s internal attention upon
the to-be-retrieved material appears to be necessary for success-
ful recollection of episodic memories. Indeed, this claim is fur-
ther supported by recent neuropsychological studies on patients
with parietal damage. As mentioned above, the traditional view
is that patients with parietal lesions do not exhibit memory
deﬁcits. However, recent studies suggest that when recollection
requires demanding internal maintenance and monitoring of
retrieved information, patients with parietal damage show sig-
niﬁcant impairments relative to healthy controls. For instance,
Berryhill et al. (2007) reported that, when compared with healthy
controls, patients with bilateral ventral parietal lesions showed
reduced levels of free-recall during autobiographical memory
tasks as opposed to cued-recall, where they show no impair-
ment. In addition,when comparedwithmatched controls,patients
2According to the dual-process theory, recognition consists of two independent
processes: recollection and familiarity. On the one hand, recollection involves the
effortful retrieval of information about the encoded material plus contextual asso-
ciations. Remembering the details of where you parked your car, its precise location
and the visual layout of the surrounding environment constitute an example of a
recollection-based memory. On the other hand, familiarity involves the mere feeling
of having encountered the recognized item before, but without the capacity of con-
juring up any details associated to such item. The feeling that you know someone
you run into at a party without being able to place where you met her or what
her name may be is an example of a familiarity-based memory (for a review, see
Yonelinas, 2002).
showed decreased levels of vividness and number of details in their
recollections during free- as opposed to cued-recall.
Curiously, when considered from the point of view of free-
recall, a classic study conducted by Bisiach and Luzzatti (1978)
appears to be consistent with the claim that parietal damage
impairs voluntary retrieval of stored information. Bisiach andLuz-
zatti (1978) asked a patient with a parietal lesion resulting in severe
hemispatial neglect, to remember the main square in Milan, the
city in which he had lived all his life. Despite claiming to know the
square quite well, the patient’s report omitted the buildings to the
left of the square when he tried to remember it facing one direc-
tion.When asked to imagine crossing the square and turning back,
so he would be now facing the other direction from the opposite
side, he omitted the buildings to his left even though he had just
reported them. This surprising observation strongly suggests that
damage to the parietal cortex, critical for the selection, and main-
tenance of visual information in external attention tasks, is also
critical for the voluntary selection and maintenance of internal
information during memory retrieval in conditions of free-recall.
The involvement of the parietal cortex during episodicmemory
retrieval has been a systematic ﬁnding in neuroimaging studies.
For that reason, some theorists suggest that the role the parietal
cortexmay be playing during recollection is tantamount to the role
it plays during visual perception. One of the most explicit articula-
tions of this view has been put forth byCabeza and colleagues (e.g.,
Cabeza, 2008; Cabeza et al., 2008). According to their “Attention to
Memory” (AtoM) hypothesis, the dorsal parietal cortex, which is
usually associated with top-down attention, is involved in volun-
tary, goal-directed attention, whereas the ventral parietal cortex,
which is usually involved in bottom-up attention, appears to be
associated with involuntary recollection (see Hutchinson et al.,
2009, for some counter-evidence, but also Cabeza et al., 2011, for
a response). Another hypothesis suggests that the parietal cortex
may play a role analogous to the working-memory buffer sug-
gested by Baddeley et al. (1998), insofar as it is required for gating
stored information for decision-making and action (Wagner et al.,
2005). Finally, one recent hypothesis – the Cortical Binding of
Relational Activity (CoBRA) – suggests that the parietal cortex
may modulate the reactivation of disaggregated sensory compo-
nents during retrieval in order to bind them in the uniﬁed whole
we experience during recollection (Shimamura, 2011). Although
the jury is still out as to which of these views best captures the
role of the parietal cortex during memory retrieval, for the present
purposes it sufﬁces to say that they all agree in that it plays a critical
role in the selection (either voluntary or involuntary),modulation
(either top-down or bottom-up), and maintenance of internally
generated information – which, according to the operational deﬁ-
nition used above,means that it plays a critical role during internal
attention to memory representations.
In sum, the evidence reviewed in this section suggests that inter-
nal attention is required for the retrieval of episodic memories.
Behavioral studies using divided attention paradigms show that
when internal attention to material-congruent deeply encoded
information is disrupted during retrieval, recollection is sig-
niﬁcantly impaired. In addition, neuropsychological studies in
patients with parietal cortex damage, which usually results in
attentional impairments to external stimuli, also suggest that
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under free-recall conditions they tend to retrieve less percep-
tual details from their autobiographical memories relative to both
cued-recall and healthy controls. Finally, extant data coming from
neuroimaging studies shows the involvement of attention-related
parietal regions during episodic retrieval, further supporting the
idea that internal attention plays a critical role during recollection.
However, even if attention is required for episodic retrieval, there
is still a further question as to whether it is necessary for con-
scious recollection – that is, the subjective experience of reliving
the retrieved memory. In the next section I argue that this question
should be answered in the afﬁrmative.
INTERNAL ATTENTION IS NECESSARY FOR CONSCIOUS
RECOLLECTION
The evidence reviewed so far suggests that internal attention is
required for episodic memory retrieval. I now want to suggest
that internal attention is also a necessary mechanism by means of
whichwe become conscious of successfully retrievedmemories.As
mentioned before, episodic recollection requires the orchestrated
operations of several brain regions. First, neuropsychological and
neuroimaging studies show that the prefrontal cortex is involved
in the initiation, monitoring, and maintenance of the retrieval
attempt (Buckner and Wheeler, 2001). In particular, it has been
suggested that the ventrolateral regions of the prefrontal cortex
are involved in the initiation and maintenance of episodic mem-
ory retrieval, while the dorsolateral regions have been associated
with the updating and manipulation of retrieved features (Wag-
ner, 2002; Cabeza and St. Jacques, 2007). Second, recent evidence
suggests that the medial–temporal lobes – previously thought
to be involved only during memory encoding (but see Squire,
2004) – are also required for the successful binding and access-
ing of relational information from the neocortex during memory
retrieval (Gilboa et al., 2005; Moscovitch et al., 2006). Finally, as
mentioned in the previous section, it is now well accepted that
the parietal cortex is involved in memory retrieval. Although its
precise role remains elusive, extant theories suggests that it plays a
role in the ﬁltering and selection of information distributed in the
sensory cortices (Shimamura, 2011).
It has also been suggested that this prefrontal/medial–
temporal/parietal network of activation associated with episodic
memory retrieval plays a critical role in the informational pro-
cessing that gives rise to conscious awareness of mental contents.
This suggestionhas been thoroughly developedwithin the inﬂuen-
tial framework of the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) model
suggested by Dehaene and Changeux (2000; see also Dehaene
et al., 2003, 2006; Changeux and Dehaene, 2008; and Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011). Brieﬂy stated, the GNW model postulates two
computational spaces in the brain, characterized by different pat-
terns of connection. On the one hand, there is a processing network,
which is seen as a set of local, informationally encapsulated, func-
tionally specialized, and domain speciﬁc processors with limited
numbers of medium-range connections. On the other hand, there
is the GNW, which is characterized by distributed sets of cortical
networks with long-range excitatory and inhibitory connections,
allowing them to send and receive projections from distant areas
in a global and ﬂexible manner, so that the information these
networks processes is neither encapsulated nor domain speciﬁc.
The projections that compose the GNW originate from pyramidal
cells from layers II and III, the number of which is particularly
high in lateral prefrontal, parietal, and medial–temporal cor-
tices, speciﬁcally in the hippocampus, entorhinal, perirhinal, and
parahippocampal cortices (vonEconomo,1929; see alsoChangeux
and Dehaene, 2008). Thus, according to the GNW hypothesis,
informational inputs that enter the global neuronal workspace
constitute the mental contents of which we are consciously aware.
The claim that attention is necessary for retrieved memories to
become conscious becomes clear when it is considered from the
point of view of the GNW hypothesis. Take the case of conscious
recollection during free-recall. Assuming that whatwe know about
the neural correlates of recollection is roughly accurate, the lateral
prefrontal cortexwould presumably initiate the process of retrieval
(Rugg et al., 2002). Information is thus projected onto the ventral
parietal cortex as well as the hippocampal and parahippocam-
pal gyri, where stored indices of distributed sensory information
would enable the binding of disaggregated memory traces (Nadel
and Moscovitch, 2001). Then, dorsal regions of the parietal cortex
would support the maintenance of the selected information via
amplifying the signal from the local processing networks where it
resides. When the signal reaches a certain threshold – most likely
within the gamma frequency of 30–100 Hz (Jensen et al., 2007; see
below) – the local sensory information that forms the memory
trace would be broadcasted onto the global neuronal workspace
which, by the GNW hypothesis, renders the memory not only
conscious but also available for action. Since attention appears to
operate via neural synchronization (e.g., Steinmetz et al., 2000),
it follows that attention is the mechanism required to enhance
gamma-band responses in local processing networks, which in
turn renders them available for broadcasting onto the global
neuronal workspace. Since these local processing networks rep-
resent stored rather than externally generated information from
the immediate surrounding environment, the kind of attention
required to render it available to the global neuronal workspace
is internal instead of external attention. Thus, internal attention
turns out to be necessary for conscious recollection.
Evidence in favor of the claim that internal attention per-
mits the broadcasting of locally processedmemory representations
onto consciousness, comes from several electrophysiological and
neuropsychological studies. As previously mentioned, attention
appears to act upon local networks by modulating their synchro-
nized ﬁring (Steinmetz et al., 2000). Neuronal synchronization
increases neuronal ﬁring, which in turn promotes synaptic plas-
ticity (Wespatat et al., 2004). Such neuronal changes have been
correlated with increases in the gamma frequency of the rele-
vant local network, which may explain why gamma-frequency
activity predicts successful encoding during memory tasks, as
conﬁrmed by numerous EEG and MEG studies (e.g., Sederberg
et al., 2003; Paller et al., 2009). Critically, increases in gamma
activity have also been correlated with successful retrieval of old
items versus correct rejection of new items (Gruber et al., 2004;
Osipova et al., 2006; for a review see Jensen et al., 2007). Moreover,
in a recent study involving intracranial electroencephalographic
recordings in 52 patients with epilepsy, Sederberg et al. (2007) dis-
covered that the same pattern of gamma-frequency activity that
predicts successful encoding reappears at retrieval. Of note, this
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research February 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 29 | 6
De Brigard Attention in conscious recollection
oscillatory activity emerges in the prefrontal cortex and the hip-
pocampus, and then spreads onto the sensory cortex – an observa-
tion consistent with several of the aforementioned neuroimaging
results on memory retrieval. This ﬁnding, coupled with previous
results showing the involvement of parieto-occipital regions in
the modulation of gamma-frequency activity during recollection
(Osipova et al., 2006), gives further support to the claim that the
prefrontal/medial–temporal/parietal cortex plays a critical role in
gating information from local sensory networks onto the global
neuronal workspace.
Behavioral studies conducted with individuals who suffered
parietal lesions give further support to the claim that internal
attention gates memories into consciousness. If, as hypothesized,
parietal regions modulate the availability of local sensory repre-
sentations onto the global neuronal workspace, one should expect
a diminished sense of “re-experiencing”or “autonoetic conscious-
ness” in patients whose parietal lesions hinder such broadcasting.
Indeed, this prediction has been recently conﬁrmed. Berryhill et al.
(2007) tested autobiographical recollection in patients with bilat-
eral parietal lesions and showed that, during free-recall, these indi-
viduals exhibited fewer episodic details and reported lower levels of
vividness in their recollections, suggesting that a reduced number
of sensory representations were actually made available to their
conscious experience. In a related study, Davidson et al. (2008)
reported that patientswith parietal lesions showed a reducednum-
ber of “remember” responses, which are associated with increased
subjective experience of recollection, relative to both “know”
responses and controls. Drowos et al. (2010) also found reduced
levels of “remember” relative to “know” responses in patients with
parietal lesions using theDesee/Roediger-McDermott (DRM)par-
adigm. Finally, Simons et al. (2010) found that patients with
bilateral parietal damage showed lower conﬁdence levels for source
recollection tasks, a result they interpret as suggesting that parietal
lobe lesions impair subjective experience of episodic recollec-
tion. The view that internal attention is required for conscious
recollection is entirely consistent with their interpretation.
Finally, the claim that internal attention is necessary for con-
scious recollection also ﬁnds support when one considers cued-
recall – albeit this foundation is perhaps more speculative. The
fact that richer retrieval cues increase the likelihood of successful
retrieval is at the heart of the notion of retrieval support, but it
also suggests that these richer cues work precisely because they
have a better chance of “highlighting” the relevant memory trace
than poorer retrieval cues. This thought lies at the foundation
of Tulving’s (1982) classic synergistic ecphory model, according to
which the subjective sense of recollection occurs when the mem-
ory trace interfaces with the retrieval cue – a process he, following
Semon (1904), called “ecphory.” Although little is known about
the neural underpinnings of ecphory, research on memory rein-
statement suggest that cued-recall facilitates the reactivation of
regions engaged during encoding (Rugg et al., 1998, 2008). In
a recent study, Manning et al. (2011) used electrocorticographic
recordings in 69 patients during study and cued-recalled tests.
They found that the recorded electrophysiological pattern of brain
activity during encoding correlated with the pattern at retrieval.
Critically,when successful reinstatementwas evidenced it occurred
within the gamma-band, suggesting the modulation of attentional
mechanisms. This activity may be related to bottom-up attention,
as suggested by Cabeza’s (2008) AtoM model. It may also relate
to the phenomenon of spontaneous autobiographical recollec-
tions that occur when unexpected stimulus, acting as powerful
cues, manage to unintentionally trigger episodes from our past
(Berntsen, 2010). Further research is needed to understand the
precise ways in which bottom-up internal attention may render
memories conscious. Nonetheless, the evidence reviewed in this
section strongly suggests that internal attention is not only neces-
sary to successfully retrieve episodic memories: it is also needed to
render them conscious.
INTERNAL ATTENTION MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR
CONSCIOUS RECOLLECTION
Although internal attention is necessary for retrieved contents to
become conscious, recent evidence suggests that is not sufﬁcient.
There are two main reasons why this may be the case. The ﬁrst
reason is that successful episodic recollection requires that the
memorial contents one internally attends to are effectively rein-
stated during retrieval. Striking evidence in favor of this claim
comes from studies with patients suffering from visual amne-
sia. Rubin and Greenberg (1998) reported 11 cases of patients
with focal lesions in occipital cortex. Although these patients did
not exhibit retrograde or anterograde amnesia – as their medial–
temporal lobes were preserved – they did show marked deﬁcits in
remembering visual details from their episodic autobiographical
memories, the non-visual details of which they were still able to
remember (Greenberg et al., 2005). Similar observations can be
found in patients with certain kinds of visual agnosias, such as
color and spatial location; these patients recollection of color and
spatial details is impaired relative to their recollection of other pre-
served visual details, such as volume or directionality (Farah et al.,
1988). If my rendition of the GNW model as it applies to conscious
recollection is roughly correct, then we can ﬁnd an explanation as
to why these patients cannot access these particular informational
contents consciously: it is not because they cannot attend to them,
but rather because, when they try to, there is nothing to attend to.
The damage in the occipital cortex makes it impossible to reinstate
the sensory content which, had it been internally attended, would
have been consciously recalled3.
Further support for this claim comes from a recent behavioral
experiment conducted by Guerin et al. (2012). After studying a
series of items, participants were presented with a recognition test
inwhich theyhad to select oneof three items.Critically, in one con-
dition, participants saw two related items, both of the same kind
as the studied item, plus a non-related item. None of the items
was the studied item itself. In another condition, participants saw
one non-related item and two related items, one of which was, in
fact, the target item. Importantly, in the condition where the two
3In essence, this is the same explanation the GNW model offers to account for
attentional blink (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2006). If the iconic memory of the masked
stimulus in the occipital cortex has been erased and replaced by the masking item,
when internal attention is reoriented toward the ﬁrst content (i.e., the masked stim-
ulus), it ﬁnds that such content is no longer available for conscious processing, so
only the second content (i.e., the masking item) is broadcasted. I believe a similar
phenomenon occurs during change blindness (for an explanation see De Brigard
and Prinz, 2010).
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related items that did not include the target item,participants’ false
alarm rate was at baseline level; whereas, in the condition in which
one of the two related items was the target item, participant’s false
alarm rate was signiﬁcantly reduced. Eye-tracking data collected
during this study showed that in both cases participantswere selec-
tively attending to the perceptual differences between the related
items. However, given the difference in false alarms, it appears as
though the use of attention to perceptually discriminate between
two related foils was not sufﬁcient for the accurate retrieval of the
target item. However, once the content was reinstated – as when
the target item was actually seen next to a foil – it was more likely
to capture internal attention, rendering it accessible for conscious
recollection. This result suggests that, in addition to directing one’s
internal attention to stored contents, the presence of such contents
is required for attention to render them conscious during recollec-
tion. As a consequence, internal attention appears to be necessary
but perhaps not sufﬁcient for conscious recollection.
The second reason attention may not be sufﬁcient for con-
scious recollection has to do with the fact that attention is not
an all-or-nothing process. It may be possible that, being a mod-
ulatory mechanism, attention can render contents conscious only
if a certain threshold is reached. Indeed, this is a fall-out of the
GNW model (Dehaene et al., 2003). It has also been proven
experimentally in numerous studies showing that, under speciﬁc
conditions, certain stimuli can exhibit attentional-cuing effects –
even at the neuronal level – and yet those same stimuli go com-
pletely unnoticed by the subject (see, for instance, van Boxtel
et al., 2010, for a review). The same may occur with memory
traces that, for one reason or another, cannot reach the con-
scious threshold even when modulated by internal attentional
mechanisms. In fact, it may be possible that unattended memory
representations are responsible for certain priming effects as well
as familiarity-based recognition judgments (Paller et al., 2009).
Further research is needed to clarify the conditions under which
internal attention tomemory representationsmay sufﬁce to render
them conscious.
CONCLUSION
While this review only scratches the surface of a rather convo-
luted puzzle, I believe that the evidence surveyed in this paper
strongly suggests that internal, as opposed to external, attention
is necessary but maybe not sufﬁcient for conscious recollection.
There are still several open questions that deserve further scrutiny.
Perhaps the most pressing one consists of deﬁning the precise
mechanisms involved in the kind of internal attention required
for conscious recollection. Not only is there substantial disagree-
ment as to the extent of the overlap between the neural correlates
of external and internal attention (Chun and Johnson, 2011), there
is also disagreement as to the precise role each kind of attention
plays during conscious experience. Another critical question
concerns the role that attention plays during familiarity-based
rather than recollection-based recognition (Yonelinas, 2002). As
discussed, disturbing internal attention during retrieval affects
recollection but not familiarity. Moreover, patients with parietal
damage report signiﬁcantly reduced numbers of “know” versus
“remember” responses and lower conﬁdence ratings, which are
thought to track subjective feelings of remembering, suggesting
that their recollective experience is impoverished (Davidson et al.,
2008). Further research will be critical in illuminating the role
that internal attention plays in differentiating recollection from
familiarity.
Finally, it is also possible that the dispensability of internal
attention during procedural memory performance could help us
understand the difference between implicit and explicit memory
(Schacter, 1992).Althoughmuch is known about the neuralmech-
anisms responsible for these two kinds of memory, the precise role
internal attention plays – if at all – during retrieval of implicit
information is still understudied. In a pioneer study, Gooding
et al. (1999) tested participants on an implicit word-stem com-
pletion test under divided attention conditions and found no
differences in performance relative to full attention. Similar results
were found using related paradigms, such as artiﬁcial-grammar
learning tasks (Helman and Berry, 2003) and repetition priming
(Clarke and Butler, 2008), supporting the hypothesis that atten-
tion does not play a critical role during the retrieval of implicit
memory. Strong support in favor of this view comes from recent
studies by Lozito and Mulligan (2010). Using a variety of implicit
memory tasks – such as perceptual identiﬁcation and category
exemplar production tests – under divided attention conditions,
Lozito and Mulligan (2010) found no effect of divided attention
during implicit retrieval, and also noperformance costs for the sec-
ondary task. To the best of my knowledge, the only study showing
some reduction in priming during divided attention conditions at
retrieval is Kinoshita (1999), who used a re-arranged word-stem
completion task.As such, it remains a possibility that speciﬁc kinds
of implicit tasks could require some level of attentional allocation.
Further research is needed to understand this particular issue, and
its relation to the more general question of the role of attention in
conscious recollection.
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